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Innovations: the Case of the Italian Mobile Value-Added Services 
(VAS) Industry 
 
Adoption Network and Early market survival of Innovations 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – Considering the strikingly high number of new products and services that 
are withdrawn from the market very soon after launch, this paper studies how early 
market survival is affected by decisions regarding a particular launch tactic, i.e. the 
configuration of the adoption network through which the innovation is 
commercialized. The paper also investigates how the impact on early market survival 
of this launch tactics depends on the maturity of the technology underlying the new 
service. 
Design/methodology/approach – The conceptual model relating the variables “size 
of the adoption network”, “brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the 
adoption network”, “maturity of the underlying technology” and “early market 
survival” is tested in the empirical setting of the Italian mobile Value Added Services 
market, utilizing a longitudinal dataset which includes more than 28,000 new VAS 
launched between 2003 and 2007. 
Findings – The paper shows that increasing the number of external organizations 
involved in the adoption network is a particularly effective tactical decision for new 
services based on very novel technologies, whereas building an adoption network that 
involves organizations with high brand awareness in the eyes of prospective 
customers positively impacts the early market survival of services relying on mature 
technologies. 
Originality/value – Besides providing practical insight to product and marketing 
managers seeking to maximize the chances of early survival of the services they are 
responsible for, the paper has interesting implications for launch decisions and 
diffusion of innovation research. 
Keywords innovation; early market survival; adoption network; launch tactic; 
underlying technology maturity; brand awareness. 
Paper Type Research Paper 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Across industries and geographies there is a clear pattern whereby a very high number 
of new products or services fail very soon after they are launched into the market 
(Cierpicky et al., 2000). Because of the limited diffusion and customer acceptance 
that they experience, their sales are discontinued very early, as it happened, e.g., with 
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the IBM PC-Junior in 1985 or the Google Wave networking service in 2010. This 
often results into major financial losses, that can even cause the innovating firm’s 
bankruptcy. 
 
As noted by Gourville (2006), there is a tendency to believe that these early failures 
are due to inaccurate product development, e.g., the inability to understand the need of 
the prospective clients, which causes a lack of critical functionalities. In fact, the early 
diffusion and customer acceptance of a new product or service can be greatly affected 
by the strategies and tactics used to launch it into the market (Chiesa and Frattini, 
2011). This is clear if we consider the high number of innovations that, despite being 
technically and functionally superior to competing products, were far less successful 
due to inaccurate launch (Hartley, 2005). 
 
Research has shown that managers can increase new product and service success 
through a well planned and executed launch process (Langerak et al., 2004; Montoya-
Weiss and Calantone, 1994). Several levers can be acted upon during market launch 
by product and marketing managers. They can be distinguished, as proposed by 
Hultink and colleagues (see, e.g., Hultink et al., 1997), into:  
(i) strategic launch decisions, i.e. those that are taken before the actual 
introduction of the innovation into the market or even before starting its 
development, and basically define the context in which the launch of the new 
product occurs), and;  
(ii)  tactical launch decisions, i.e. those encompassing the key elements of the 
marketing mix, concerned therefore with the operational issues of the 
innovation’s launch. 
 
Much empirical work has been done (see, e.g., Talke and Colarelli O’Connor, 2011; 
Talke and Hultink, 2010a,b; Hultink et al., 1997, 1998; Hultink and Robben, 1999; 
Hultink and Hart, 1998; Hultink et al., 2000) to investigate the impact of launch 
decisions on several dimensions of a new product success. These dimensions can be 
grouped into:  
(i) product performance, e.g., the new product’s quality and competitive 
advantage;  
(ii) market performance, e.g., the new product’s market share, sales or ROI).  
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However, as noted by Asterbo and Michela (2005), no systematic analysis has 
focused so far on the impact of launch decisions on a particular aspect of new product 
performance, i.e. early market survival. Using the traditional product life cycle model 
(Day, 1981), early market survival is defined in this paper as the ability of a new 
product or service to survive the introduction stage of its life-cycle and not being 
withdrawn from the market before its sales can eventually enter the steady growth 
phase. In addition to the fact that early survival has been under researched in launch 
strategy and tactics literature so far, focusing on this performance dimension is 
relevant because early product survival is key to firm survival, especially in case of 
new technology-based ventures (Asplund and Sandin, 1999). 
 
The adoption network of a new product or service encompasses all those interrelated 
organizations whose decisions and behavior affect each other’s and, most importantly, 
the innovation’s diffusion and market acceptance (Chakravorti, 2003; Chiesa and 
Frattini, 2011; Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2012). It includes, for instance, 
companies supplying complementary hardware, software and service and those 
involved in distributing the innovation and information about it. This paper 
contributes to fill the research gap on the relationship between adoption networks and 
survival by proposing a conceptual model (see Figure 1) which investigates the 
impact of a critical tactical launch decision on the innovation early market survival. In 
particular, the paper studies:  
(i) how the configuration of the adoption network of the new product or service 
affects early market survival; 
(ii)  how the maturity of the technology on which the new product or service is 
based moderates the relationship between the configuration of the adoption 
network and early market survival.  
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Figure 1: Conceptual model 
 
The model is tested utilizing a longitudinal dataset which includes more than 28,000 
new mobile Value Added Services (VAS)[i] launched between 2003 and 2007 on the 
Italian market. This setting is very appropriate for the analysis because: 
 the relevance of the mobile VAS market in the worldwide mobile 
telecommunications landscape is rising dramatically, as analysts expect its global 
value, only partially hindered by the ongoing recession, will exceed 100 billion $ 
by 2013 (Strategy Analytics, 2010); 
 the Italian mobile VAS market has experienced a significant expansion in the 
recent years, with an average growth rate per year equal to 26% (Bertelè and 
Rangone, 2008) to the point that Italy is the European country where mobile VAS 
have experienced the most significant diffusion in the last decade; 
 Italy shows the highest European content ARPU, and has the highest European 
smartphone penetration rate (32%) (Juniper Research, 2009; Strategy Analytics, 
2010); 
 firms competing in the mobile VAS industry are very innovative and hundreds of 
new services are launched every year on the market; 
 the mobile VAS industry is characterized by a very high mortality rate, with a 
sizeable percentage of new services being withdrawn from the market a few 
months after launch, and a limited number of VAS that survive for several years 
and become the source of substantial revenues and profits. Therefore, early market 
survival is an important determinant of competitive advantage for mobile VAS 
firms; 
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 at a given point in time, the same mobile VAS (e.g., a daily sport news service) 
can be delivered through different technological platforms (e.g., SMS, Browsing 
and Download), each characterized by a different level of maturity; 
 the launch process for a mobile VAS is particularly complex and comprises 
several different activities, to which adoption networks with very dissimilar 
configurations correspond. 
 
From a practical point of view, the paper provides product and marketing managers 
with insights about how to increase the odds of early market survival of mobile VAS, 
especially those based on very new and embryonic technologies, by acting on the 
configuration of their adoption network. Furthermore, the paper points to the 
importance of focusing on a further critical aspect when studying the dimensions of 
new product or service success, i.e. early market survival. Product management and 
launch strategy research could investigate in the future what further endogenous (i.e. 
managerial levers) and exogenous (i.e. environmental conditions) variables affect this 
particular facet of innovation performance. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section develops theory and hypotheses. 
Section 3 describes the data and the methodology applied in the empirical analysis, 
while Section 4 reports and discusses the major empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 
concludes and outlines opportunities for future research. 
 
 
2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Launch strategies and tactics 
Research on new product launch strategies and tactics have originated and expanded 
during the 1980s. This body of literature mainly emphasized empirical analyses of the 
relationship between launch strategy and new product performance, without 
developing first a theoretical understanding of the concepts and then testing the theory 
(Hultink et al., 1998). The impact of launch strategy on new product performance was 
investigated, among the others, by Choffray and Lilien (1984, 1986), Green and 
Ryans (1990), Yoon and Lilien (1985). Nevertheless, drawing general conclusions 
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from this research was complex due to the inclusion of different launch variables in 
the different studies and because each investigation was incomplete, only exploring a 
subset of the decision that make up a launch strategy. In the second half of the 1990s, 
studies started to focus on developing a comprehensive theoretical understanding of 
the new product launch concept and then link it to market performance, using large 
empirical databases (see, e.g., Hultink et al., 1997, 2000). 
 
One of the major contributions of this body of research regards the definition of the 
new product launch concept. According to Hultink and colleagues, a launch strategy 
can be defined as “[…] those decisions and activities necessary to present a product to 
its target market and begin to generate income from sale of the new product” (Hultink 
et al., 1997, pg. 245). They show that a relevant part of the launch decision-making 
occurs prior to making the marketing mix launch decisions, and even before the new 
product development (NPD) process is started. These are called strategic launch 
decisions and concern the “what” to launch, “where” to launch, “when” to launch and 
“why” to launch. They define therefore the strategic contest in which market launch 
occurs and are related to product, market, competitive and firm strategic issues. 
Nonetheless, other commercialization decisions take place after the conceptual and 
physical development of the product has been completed. These can be named tactical 
launch decisions and are concerned with the “how” to launch the new product, i.e. 
with the elements of the so-called “marketing mix” (product, price, promotion and 
distribution decisions). 
 
Configuration of the adoption network 
In this paper we focus on a particular tactical launch decision, i.e. the configuration of 
the adoption network of the new product or service. This aspect has received limited 
attention in launch research so far, although it appears to be a critical determinant of 
new product performance, especially in high-technology industries (Frattini, 2010; 
Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2012). In the last years, more and more markets have 
taken on the characteristics of networks (Chakravorti, 2004), due to the improvements 
in communication technologies, the advent of the internet and an increased 
internationalization of business activities. Therefore decisions regarding launch and 
adoption of innovations are more and more distributed among many interrelated 
organizations, whose behavior influences each other’s. These players represent the so-
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called adoption network of the new product or service (Chakravorti, 2003), which 
usually comprises:  
(i) companies supplying complementary hardware, software and contents 
that improve the value of the innovation for prospective clients;  
(ii) companies engaged in distributing the innovation and disseminating 
information about it;  
(iii) companies providing complementary services (e.g., pre- and post-sale 
assistance, billing, payment). Research suggests that the way in which 
this adoption network is configured heavily affects the degree of 
diffusion and market acceptance of new products and services 
(Chakravorti, 2003).  
In particular, the size of the adoption network and the type of organizations it includes 
can make the difference between a successful and unsuccessful innovation (Chiesa 
and Frattini, 2011). This seems to be particularly true in high-technology, high-
velocity industries, as shown by high-tech marketing scholars (Easingwood and 
Beard, 1989, Beard and Easingwood, 1996). 
 
A new product or service fails to survive the early stages of its life cycle because it 
experiences unsatisfactory levels of sales, i.e. due to limited customer acceptance. 
According to sociological theories of innovation diffusion (Turnbull and Meenaghan, 
1980; Burt, 1987; Deroïan, 2002), the first reason why potential adopters decide not to 
purchase an innovation is uncertainty. New products or services cause indeed a great 
deal of uncertainty in potential customers, which often results into a postponement of 
the adoption decision (Chiesa and Frattini, 2011). Even in case several specifications 
and consumer reports are available, and the cost of purchase is precisely determined, 
customers may still be unsure about how the product will perform for them, whether it 
is suited to the applications they have in mind and whether it will be well backed from 
the members of its adoption network. 
 
A similar argument can be also developed from a transaction costs perspective (Tyagi, 
2004; Lynch and Ariely, 2000). According to this standpoint, a potential adopter will 
purchase an innovation only when the benefits she expects to reap from using the new 
product or service will overcome the expected transaction costs. The latter are due, 
besides search, information, bargaining and decision activities, to switching, learning 
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and obsolescence phenomena (Gourville, 2006). What should be remarked here is that 
the assessment of the expected benefits and transaction costs occurs under strong 
psychological biases, which behavioral economists call “endowment effects” or 
“status quo biases” (Kahneman et al., 1990; Knetsch, 1989). Accordingly, potential 
adopters tend to overvalue the expected costs and to underestimate the benefits, in an 
irrational attempt to stick to their “status quo”. Unless uncertainty about expected 
transaction costs and benefits is lowered, resistance to purchasing the innovation on 
the part of the potential adopters will be therefore particularly soaring. 
 
Recent findings from Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg (2012) points to the important 
role that the adoption network plays in the innovation commercialization process. 
First of all they describe how the innovating firm needs resources to engage in a 
growing set of activities (e.g., customer education, distribution, marketing 
communication, relationship mediation, credibility building) when moving from R&D 
tasks to commercialization tasks. Second, they  show that, for acquiring such 
resources, the firm needs to leverage on network relations. Commenting on these 
results, Prenkert (2012) sets guidelines for future research in the field, arguing that 
higher effort should be placed in delineating innovation processes, new product 
development and business networks, so as to stress their complex and multifaceted 
nature. 
 
In this paper we argue that pre-purchase uncertainty can be reduced by product and 
marketing managers by acting on the configuration of the innovation adoption 
network. Increasing the size of the adoption network by establishing partnerships and 
cooperation agreements with many external organizations which are convinced to 
actively take part in the launch of the new product or service can be very useful to 
signal to potential purchasers that the new product or service is very well backed and 
receives support from the several parties whose role is critical to ensure a successful 
adoption and use of the new product. Winning pre-purchase resistance to adopt a new 
product or service is particularly challenging under circumstances of strong market 
interconnection, because potential adopters are especially unsure about the degree of 
support that the members of the adoption network will ensure to the innovation. We 
are assuming therefore that the value of a new product and service in the eyes of a 
potential adopter is strongly influenced indeed by the amount of support ensured by 
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these external organizations (Schilling, 2003). This is not a new idea in marketing 
(see, e.g., McKenna, 1985 and Wind and Mahajan, 1987), but it has become more and 
more critical in today’s highly networked markets. This leads us to posit that: 
 
H1: The size of the adoption network of the innovation will have a positive 
association with early market survival 
 
Besides the number of organizations which take part in the launch process, in this 
paper we argue that their brand awareness is critical as well to affect early market 
survival. Brand awareness can be conceived as a rudimentary measure of brand 
knowledge, which implies at least brand recognition by prospective customers (Hoyer 
and Brown, 1990). Marketing research shows that generating and maintaining brand 
awareness is one of the key objective of marketing, as this strongly affects adoption 
decisions, especially in situations where the customer does not own enough 
information to aid choice, as it typically happens in the earliest stages of the life cycle 
(Macdonald and Sharp, 2000; Rogers, 2003). In particular, it has been argued that 
brand awareness influences perceived quality and value of a new product or service 
by reducing pre-purchase uncertainty (Hoyer and Brown, 1990). Therefore product 
and marketing managers involved in the launch of an innovation can increase the 
likelihood of early market survival by improving the brand awareness of their firm, 
e.g., through more effective investments in advertising (Macdonald and Sharp, 2000). 
However, in this paper we argue that, in highly interconnected markets, it is not only 
the awareness of the firm launching the new product or service that influences 
customer adoption decision, but also that of the organizations involved in the adoption 
network. Put it differently, customers’ perception regarding the degree of support that 
a new product or service will receive from its adoption network will be positively 
affected by customers’ knowledge and recognition of the members of the adoption 
network. Therefore, product and marketing managers can improve the likelihood of 
early market survival by involving in the adoption network, through properly planned 
and executed collaboration agreements, organizations characterized by a particularly 
high awareness among prospective customers. This leads us to posit that: 
 
H2: The brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the adoption network of 
the innovation will have a positive association with early market survival 
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Maturity of the underlying technology 
As shown in Figure 1, in this paper we are also interested in the moderating role of the 
maturity of the technology on which the new product or service is based. Especially in 
high-technology innovation, it often happens that the same functionality incorporated 
in a new product or service can be delivered to customers using an already established 
and well-known technology (e.g., voting a TV program by sending an SMS), or 
through an embryonic technological platform, which is almost unknown to 
prospective users and often requires them to change the approach through which they 
interact with the product or service (e.g., voting a TV program browsing the web with 
the mobile phone). The degree of change in behavior and consumption patterns 
required to customers to use an innovation can be significantly affected by the 
maturity of the technology on which the new product or service is based (Veryzer, 
1998). 
 
Our assumption is that the greater the change in behavior and consumer patterns 
required from potential adopters to make the most out of a new product or service, the 
higher the degree of pre-purchase uncertainty she will perceive, which can slow and 
freeze early diffusion, as discussed above (Chiesa and Frattini, 2011). This 
proposition is grounded in marketing research, which indicates that the chances of 
having a new product withdrawn from the market for poor commercial results early 
after launch is especially high for really-new products (Alexander et al., 2008). This is 
due to the fact that, when confronted with a radically-new product, as compared with 
an incrementally new one, customers perceive:  
(i) higher uncertainty regarding the consumption benefits and transaction 
costs (Hoeffler, 2003);  
(ii)  the need to more deeply modify their behavior to fully benefit from the 
new product (Gourville, 2006).  
This strongly increases their resistance to change, which underlies any decisions to 
adopt an innovation. It can be argued therefore that the more novel the technology on 
which an innovation is based, the higher the level of pre-purchase uncertainty that 
potential adopters will perceive. 
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A similar argument can be developed also by looking into research on the dynamics 
of technological change (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Utterback and Abernathy, 
1975), which indicates that in the early, pre-paradigmatic phases of a technology’s life 
cycle, several alternative technologies fiercely compete for achieving market 
acceptance. These periods of ferment are characterized by a high level of uncertainty 
as regards which technology will establish itself as the dominant design in the 
industry (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Therefore, the more a new product or 
service is based on a technology which is in the early stages of its life cycle, the 
higher the uncertainty perceived by potential adopters and hence the higher the 
likelihood that they will postpone purchase. 
 
Based on these premises, it can be argued that acting on the configuration of the 
adoption network, by increasing its size and involving organization characterized by a 
strong brand awareness, becomes especially critical for the early market survival of 
those new products and services based on very new technologies, as the level of pre-
purchase uncertainty perceived by potential adopters is particularly soaring under 
these circumstances. Therefore we posit the following two hypotheses: 
 
H1a: The size of the adoption network will have a stronger association with early 
market survival for innovations based on new technologies, in comparison with those 
based on mature technologies 
 
H2a: The brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the adoption network 
will have a stronger association with early market survival for innovations based on 
new technologies, in comparison with those based on mature technologies 
 
The conceptual model and the research hypotheses developed in this section are 
synthesized in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Research hypotheses 
 
The next section describes the empirical data and the analyses undertaken to test our 
hypotheses. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
Empirical setting 
As previously mentioned, our research hypotheses are tested using a longitudinal 
sample built from the Italian mobile VAS industry, which arose as a part of the 
overall mobile telecommunications industry when  mobile incumbents started offering 
non-voice, value added services to create other potential sources of revenue capable of 
sustaining their future growth (Peppard and Rylander, 2006; Gartner Research, 2009).  
 
The rise of VAS, however, implied deep changes in the very structure of the mobile 
telecommunications industry, as it determined a deep value system reconfiguration 
(e.g., see Huemer, 2006; Peppard and Rylander, 2006; Funk, 2009; Ghezzi et al., 
2009). For their conception, creation, delivery and commercialization, VAS required 
the creation of a multi-actor adoption network, where diverse players cooperate so as 
to merge their expertise and assets to deliver innovative VAS. Specifically, the 
complexity of the commercialization process is due to the existence of several 
different organizational solutions that can be adopted by the Mobile Service Provider 
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(MSP) to promote a new service and deliver it to customers. First, the members of the 
adoption network of a new mobile VAS, which can be involved in its 
commercialization process, comprise: 
(i) Mobile Network Operator (MNO) – owns 3G – UMTS licenses, operates the 
mobile network, and is responsible for the provisioning of its functionalities; 
(ii) Mobile Content Provider (MCP) – owns the rights for original content to be 
delivered through the mobile channel, and concentrates on the conception and 
creation of VAS. In a broad sense, music majors, media and web companies 
also belong to such category; 
(iii)Mobile Technology Provider (MTP) – focuses on the technological 
enablement of the VAS offer, providing the Content & Service Delivery 
Platforms to create, manage and deliver digital content. 
 
These external organizations can be involved by the MSP to a varying extent in the 
several activities which are required to commercialize and launch a new service. In 
other words the adoption network can be configured according to different 
architectures. The four players take on complementary – and sometimes overlapping – 
roles when they engage themselves in the value creating activities necessary to bring a 
new service to end users (for a description of all activities, see Ghezzi et al., 2009). Of 
course some of these tasks are always under the responsibility of a particular external 
organization (e.g., the MNO is always involved in “content charging” and “content 
billing & accounting” activities), but there is the opportunity for the MSP to enlarge 
the involvement of a certain member of the adoption network to include several other 
activities (e.g., the MNO, which is highly visible to the end user of a mobile VAS due 
to its size and brand awareness, can be involved in “content delivery & market 
making” or “customer relationship management”), instead of undertaking them on its 
own. 
 
The dataset designed and employed for testing the model was extracted from the pool 
of data gathered by the Mobile VAS Observatory, a permanent research project 
promoted by the ICT & Management Observatories, a research center of Politecnico 
di Milano. The Mobile VAS Observatory has been gathering data on the Italian 
mobile market since 1998 and, starting from 2002, it has collected information 
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regarding the totality of Application-to-Person (A2P) services – i.e. those services 
produced by an application and sent to a mobile subscriber – delivered through the 
four Italian MNOs’  mobile portals. Data were collected through an annual detailed 
census regarding a set of relevant information – e.g. service category; year of 
publishing; price/fee; key features; MNO/MSP/MCP/MTP of reference; key activities 
required for placing the service on the market – for each Italian VAS[ii] (Bertelè and 
Rangone, 2008). 
 
The empirical analysis reported in this paper relies on a sample of data which includes 
more than 28,000 new mobile VAS belonging to the Short Message Service (SMS), 
the Browsing and the Download service categories, and launched between 2003 and 
2007 on the Italian market[iii]. The selected timeframe influences the choice of the 
service underlying technologies. Between 2003 and 2007, three technologies were of 
particular importance for the Italian mobile VAS industry: 
 SMS, which allows to send short text messages to and between mobile phones, 
and contain the embedded information representing the VAS – e.g. for 
infotainment services –. The first A2P services based on SMS were delivered to 
Italian customers in 2003; 
 Browsing – also known as Mobile-Browsing or Micro-Browsing –, which allows 
the user to surf Mobile-Sites and Mobile-Portals as it happens with traditional 
browsers. A2P VAS delivered through the Browsing technology appeared on the 
Italian market in 2004; 
 Download, which allows the user to download mobile contents as it happens with 
traditional browsers. A2P VAS delivered through the Download technology 
appeared on the Italian market in 2004. 
 
Variables 
For properly defining and measuring the variables used in our analysis, we exploited 
the fact that one of the authors works in the ICT & Management Observatory research 
group. This allowed us to organize and conduct direct interviews (Yin, 2003) more 
than ten experts in the Italian mobile VAS industry and take part to several 
conferences and workgroups organized by the ICT & Management Observatory prior 
to starting data modeling and analysis. Appendix 1 provides details on the experts that 
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were interviewed prior to starting our study and the type of open-ended questions 
around which the interviews were organized. Informants were selected on the basis of 
their prominent role and professional background within the Mobile 
Telecommunications industry, so as to guarantee the significance and trustworthiness 
of data gathered. Completeness of information was also granted by the selection of 
informants who covered a wide span of roles in the value network – e.g., ranging from 
Chief Executive Officer to Product Manager (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The responses from interviewees were summarised, interpreted and tabulated from the 
transcripts, according to the themes of the research questions. More in details, data 
were coded within two documents: the central data-base (on a simple Excel table) and 
a word document containing the complete resume of the interviews.  If any 
information remained unclear and/or the researchers believed more data were needed, 
informants were re-contacted later by phone for additional questions. The data 
analysis has been conducted according to two complementary approaches and both a 
within-case and a cross case analysis have been carried out. The first aims at 
generating the necessary insight (Gersick 1988, Pettigrew, 1988), while the second at 
enabling inter-case comparisons and highlighting similarities and differences between 
responses. 
 
These preliminary interviews with experts in the Italian mobile VAS industry  showed 
that a remarkably high percentage of new mobile VAS do not survive the first months 
after launch. In particular, our data indicate that about 75% of the new services based 
on SMS, 62% of those delivered using the Browsing technology, and 64% of those 
delivered using the Download technology are no more offered to customers in the 
year that follows the one when they were first launched (i.e. have a life cycle which is 
shorter than 12 months). However, those services that survive the first year after 
launch remain on the market for a long time (on average for more than 3 years) and 
become a major source of revenues and profits. Accordingly, we decided to 
operationalize our dependent variable, i.e. Early market survival, as a binary variable 
which describes whether or not the new service stays on the market for less than 12 
months (Early market survival equals to 0 if the new service stays on the market for 
less than 12 months, 1 otherwise). This operationalisation leads us to consider only 
the 28,796 mobile VAS launched in Italy between 2003 and 2006, withdrawing the 
new services commercialized for the first time in 2007. 
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As mentioned in the previous section discussing the study’s empirical context, the 
configuration of the adoption network can vary depending on the strategies adopted 
by the MSP. In particular, the number of distinct players belonging to the adoption 
network and involved by the MSP during the commercialization process of the new 
service varies from 1 to 4. Considering the necessary assets and capabilities some 
tasks are always under the responsibility of a particular player (e.g., the MNO is 
always involved in “content charging” and “content billing & accounting” activities), 
but the MSP can enlarge the adoption network to other players for developing specific 
activities: for example the "content & service delivery platform provisioning” activity 
can be developed by the MNO or the MTP; the “content creation” and “content 
packaging” can be developed by the MNO or the MCP. The basic configuration of the 
adoption network includes the MNO and the MSP, only in few cases the MSP is able 
to deliver the service alone, whereas most often the MSP involves other actors (e.g., 
the MTP or MCP) to commercialize complex services. For example the service “4 
Lovers”, an infotainment dating service based on SMS, was launched in 2004 through 
an adoption network composed only by one actor, the MSP Zed. This, because the 
service was relatively simple from a technological point of view and there was no 
original content to be bundled: the MSP internally created and managed both the 
infotainment content and the related delivery platform. On the other hand, the service 
“2 Fast 2 Furious”, a mobile gaming service based on download, was launched in 
2006 and required a more complex adoption network, where 4 different actors 
interacted: the MSP Netsize, the MNO Vodafone, the MCP iPlay and the MTP 
MBlox. The presence of 4 actors was necessary to ensure that the heterogeneous 
complementary activities were properly carried out: for instance, the MSP took care 
of the content bundling, publishing and market making; the MNO handled service 
charging, billing and accounting; the MCP acquired the content rights from the movie 
major Universal Pictures; and the MTP provided the technological capabilities for 
developing the mobile game. For the reasons discussed in this paragraph, we 
operationalize the variable Size of the adoption network as a binary variable: it is 
equal to 0 if the adoption network is composed by one or two distinct actors, 1 
otherwise. 
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As the description of the empirical context shows , twelve value creating activities are 
necessary to bring a new service to customers (Funk, 2009; Ghezzi et al., 2009), but 
only three represent the front-end of the service, where interaction with the end user 
takes place: portal provisioning; content delivery & market making; customer 
relationship management. The MSP has to face specific constraints in the 
development of the adoption network because these front-end activities can be 
developed only by the MSP or, alternatively, by the MNO. The four Italian MNOs 
(Vodafone Italy, TIM, H3G and Wind) represent well-known and historical brands, 
they invest significant resources in promotional activities using mass-media channels 
such as the TV or the web aimed at increasing their brand awareness and their 
reputation. Their size and investments potential allows them to access pervasive 
promotion and communication channels, thus getting in contact with numerous end 
users. On the other hand, MSPs are mainly new high-tech companies with 
significantly smaller budgets for marketing and communication activities, in 
comparison with MNOs. This means that they can invest in advertising only through 
more specific channels and consequently reach less end users. Considering that 
product and marketing managers can improve the likelihood of early market survival 
by involving organizations characterized by a particularly high awareness among 
prospective customers we operationalize the variable Brand awareness of the 
organizations comprised in the adoption network as a binary variable that equals to 0 
if all the front-end activities are developed by the MSP, 1 if at least one front-end 
activity is developed by the MNO. 
 
Around 95% of the new A2P mobile VAS launched in Italy between 2003 and 2006 
were based on three underlying technologies: SMS, Browsing and Download. If 
MMS represented a marginal technology, only in 2007 new platforms were proposed 
on the Italian market: Streaming, Videocall, DVB-H. While SMS represented an 
already established and well-known technology, Browsing and Download can be 
interpreted as embryonic technological platforms considering that they were launched 
on the market in 2004. SMS is labeled as the mature technology in this paper, because 
of its earlier diffusion and lower technological complexity: if the first A2P service 
delivered through the SMS technology in Italy was launched in 2004, the underlying 
technology was already mature considering the advanced stage of its lifecycle. The 
SMS platform didn't require end users to change behaviors considering the incredible 
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diffusion of Person To Person services delivered using the same technology. 
Moreover, according to the interviews with experts in the Italian mobile VAS 
industry, the SMS technology guaranteed a satisfactory level of reliability, stability, 
quality of service and user experience. For the same reasons, Browsing and 
Download, which were launched at a later point in time and are characterized by 
greater sophistication, are considered embryonic technologies in the paper. Based on 
these elements, we operationalize the Maturity of the underlying technology as a 
binary variable equals to 1 if the new service has been launched by using the SMS 
technology, 0 otherwise. 
 
As regards the method used to test our hypotheses, we used a simple t-test (Greene, 
2011; Miller, 1997), which has been already applied in a similar analysis (Frattini et 
al., 2012). 
 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The empirical results with reference to the research hypotheses are synthesized in 
Table 1. 
 
Hypothesis Empirical result Interpretation 
H1 Verified Services launched through adoption network with large 
Size show higher Innovation Survival than those 
launched through adoption network with small Size 
H1a Verified Services based on mature technologies and launched 
through adoption network with large Size show lower 
Innovation Survival than those launched through 
adoption network with small Size 
Services based on embryonic technologies and launched 
through adoption network with large Size show higher 
Innovation Survival than those launched through 
adoption network with small Size 
H2 Not Verified Brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the 
adoption network is not significant 
H2a Partially verified Services based on mature technologies and launched 
through adoption network with high Brand awareness 
show higher Innovation Survival than those launched 
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through adoption network with low Brand awareness 
Brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the 
adoption network is not significant in the case of 
embryonic technologies 
Table 1: Synthesis of empirical results and interpretations 
 
As mentioned above, the first set of hypotheses consider the impact of the Size of the 
adoption network on the Early market survival. The empirical results concerning 
hypothesis H1 (The size of the adoption network of the innovation will have a positive 
association with early market survival) and obtained through a t-test show that the 
mean value of Early Market Survival for services launched through large adoption 
networks (36.5%) is significant higher than the mean Early Market Survival for 
services launched through small adoption networks (32.4%). Hypothesis is therefore 
supported by our data (see 2). 
 
 Services launched by 
small adoption networks 
Services launched by 
large adoption networks 
Early market survival 32.4% 36.5% 
N 8,358 20,438 
T 6.803** 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 1: Impact of the Size of the adoption network on the Early market survival 
 
The empirical results appear consistent with both adoption and value network studies 
(see, e.g., Gulati, 2000; Chakravorti, 2003) as well as research into the mobile service 
industry (Funk, 2009; Ghezzi et al., 2009). The interplay of different actor typologies, 
namely MNOs, MSPs, MCPs and MTPs, who are characterized by complementary 
expertise, resources and competencies – as testified by their linked, though not 
overlapped coverage of the adoption network activities – contributes to shaping a 
solid VAS offer, that can encounter the mobile end users’ favor, and in turn, facilitate 
early market survival. Having several members of the new service adoption network 
taking part in commercialization activities increases its visibility in the eyes of early 
adopters and signals extensive commitment and endorsement for it, which helps 
reduce their uncertainty and resistance to change. 
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In order to investigate hypothesis H1a (The size of the adoption network will have a 
stronger association with early market survival for innovations based on new 
technologies, in comparison with those based on mature technologies) the t-test has 
conducted on two separated sub-samples: one including services launched through 
mature technologies (SMS) and the other comprising services launched through new 
technologies (Browsing and Download). By doing so it is possible to interpret the 
moderating role of the Maturity of the underlying technology on the relationship 
between the Size of the adoption network and the Early Market Survival. In the case 
of mature technologies, the empirical results show that the mean Early Market 
Survival for services commercialized through large adoption networks (22.3%) is 
significant lower than the mean Early Market Survival for services launched through 
small adoption networks (42.8%, see 3). 
 
 Services launched by 
small adoption networks 
Services launched by 
large adoption networks 
Innovation Survival 42.8% 22.3% 
N 374 2,809 
T -7.635** 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 2: Impact of the Size of the adoption network on the Early market survival in the case of 
mature technologies 
 
We had symmetric results for services delivered through a novel technology. In 
particular, the mean Early Market Survival for services launched through a large 
adoption network (38.8%) is significant lower than the mean Early Market Survival 
for services launched through small adoption networks (31.9%, see 4). 
 
 Services launched by 
small adoption networks 
Services launched by 
large adoption networks 
Innovation Survival 31.9% 38.8% 
N 7,984 17,629 
T 10.853** 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 3: Impact of the Size of the adoption network on the Early market survival in the case of new 
technologies 
 
These findings allow to infer the nature of the moderating role of technology maturity 
on the relationship between the size of the adoption network and the early market 
survival. In case of services delivered using mature platforms (e.g., SMS), mobile 
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customers are to a large extent used to the VAS fruition and delivery characteristics 
and therefore have only few or no concerns regarding adoption and subsequent usage. 
The maturity stage of the underlying technology guarantees indeed a satisfactory level 
of reliability, stability, quality of service and user experience. In such case, mobile 
customers somewhat take for granted usability and consolidation of the underlying 
technology, and decide to adopt the innovation on the basis of the simplicity of the 
purchasing and delivery process ensured by a small adoption network backing its 
launch. Such adoption network is typically composed by the MNO-MSP dyad 
(Peppard and Rylander, 2006; Kuo and Yu, 2006). 
 
This argument is consistent with the assumption that a wide adoption network 
involving different actors increases the pool of resources and competencies which are 
bundled in the innovation conception, creation and delivery (Ghezzi, 2009), though, at 
the same time, it increases the system’s complexity. Where the technology is mature, 
and the resources the overlaying service requires for its creation are believed to be 
widespread in the network – as if they became a sort of commodity –, the mobile 
customers prefer to avoid the increased complexity a larger adoption network brings 
about. While a share of such complexity pertains to network governance (e.g., see 
Gulati et al., 2000), it also impacts on processes which often are not fully transparent 
to the end user and may negatively affect its experience. For instance, the presence of 
multiple actors may increase the complexity associated with some critical activities 
for the fruition of the service, such as search, selection, purchase and billing (Peppard 
and Rylander, 2006; Ghezzi et al., 2010). 
 
Where the underlying technology is new and embryonic (e.g., Browsing or 
Download), however, the end user perceptions towards the innovation tend to change 
radically: given that the innovative VAS is grounded on an underlying platform which 
is an innovation in itself, the achievement of a satisfactory quality of service and of 
experience is far from being a triviality. The required resources, competencies and 
assets to shape the service are neither commoditized nor concentrated on a single 
actor’s resource endowment, but are rather dispersed throughout the adoption 
network. When such conditions hold true, mobile customers value the configuration 
of a wider adoption network where a large number of diverse players cooperate and 
integrate their core activities so as to develop and market a VAS with high quality and 
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reliability, notwithstanding its reliance on an embryonic and potentially unstable 
technology. The development of large adoption networks is particularly appropriate 
for reducing uncertainty perceived by those early customers who are taking into 
serious consideration the opportunity to purchase a new service, although it is 
delivered through a new and uncertain technological platform. The involvement of 
external organizations in the commercialization process reduces resistance to change 
on the part of those individuals who have already known about the opportunity to buy 
the new service and come to see which organizations are taking part to its 
commercialization process. 
 
The second set of hypotheses investigates the role of the Brand awareness of the 
organizations comprised in the adoption network. The statistical analysis related to 
hypothesis H2 (The brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the adoption 
network of the innovation will have a positive association with early market survival) 
points to the fact that the Brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the 
adoption network does not affect Early Market survival. Therefore, H2 is not 
statistically verified (see 5). 
 
 Services launched by 
adoption networks with 
low brand awareness 
Services launched by 
adoption networks with 
high brand awareness 
Innovation Survival 35.8% 34.4% 
N 19,780 9,016 
T -1.342 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 4: Impact of the Brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the adoption network on 
the Early market survival 
 
Similarly to the analyses previously described regarding the Size of the adoption 
network, hypothesis H2a (The brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the 
adoption network will have a stronger association with early market survival for 
innovations based on new technologies, in comparison with those based on mature 
technologies) has been tested by using two t-tests applied on separated sub-samples: 
one comprising services launched through mature technologies (SMS) and the other 
including services launched through novel technologies (Browsing, Download). By 
doing so it is possible to interpret the moderating role of the Maturity of the 
underlying technology on the relationship between the Brand awareness of the 
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organizations comprised in the adoption network and Early Market Survival. Also 
hypothesis H2a is not verified. In the case of mature technologies, the empirical 
results show indeed that the mean Early Market Survival for services launched 
through adoption networks with high brand awareness (29.0%) is significantly higher 
than the mean Early Market Survival for services launched through adoption networks 
characterized by low brand awareness (9.4%, see 6). 
 Services launched by 
adoption networks with 
low brand awareness 
Services launched by 
adoption networks with 
high brand awareness 
Innovation Survival 9.4% 29.0% 
N 694 2,489 
T 13.710** 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 5: Impact of the Brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the adoption network on 
the Early market survival in the case of mature technologies 
 
In the case of novel technologies, the difference between the Early Market Survival of 
services launched through adoption networks with high brand awareness and services 
launched through adoption networks with low brand awareness is not significant (see 
7). 
 
 Services launched by 
adoption networks with 
low brand awareness 
Services launched by 
adoption networks with 
high brand awareness 
Innovation Survival 36.7% 36.4% 
N 19,086 6,527 
T 0.487 
*p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 6: Impact of the Brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the adoption network on 
the Early market survival in the case of new technologies 
 
These empirical results can be interpreted by considering that customers are more 
used to associate the brand of the incumbent players with mature technology, since 
incumbents has built their market presence, reputation and customer basis thanks to 
services delivered for years through well-established technologies. Therefore, the 
brand awareness of the actors belonging to the adoption network, which has been 
created through intensive and multi-channel marketing campaigns, contributes to 
improving the chances of survival for innovation traditionally associated with the use 
of the consolidated SMS platform. 
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On the contrary, when dealing with embryonic technologies, mobile customers appear 
not to directly associate the innovative service with the brand awareness of the 
adoption network: such result can be explained by the partial distrust caused by early 
failures of services launched through the Download and Browsing platforms. In the 
market’s preliminary stages of development, this was the case for several Browsing 
services characterized by extremely high navigation fees, and Download services 
where contractual agreement were unclear or sometimes vicious (Bertelè and 
Rangone, 2008). Such early failures can be claimed to be the cause for the limited 
importance of the brand awareness uncovered by our analysis. 
 
Combining the results for hypotheses H1a and H2a, it can be argued that the 
involvement of external organization in the adoption network represent a launch tactic 
particularly appropriate for services based on novel technologies, while the 
development of an adoption network based on the brand awareness of its members 
positively impacts on the early market survival of services relying on mature 
underlying technologies. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Considering the strikingly high number of new products and services that are 
withdrawn from the market very soon after launch, this paper studies how early 
market survival is affected by decisions regarding a particular launch tactic, i.e. the 
configuration of the adoption network through which the innovation is 
commercialized. Furthermore, it investigates how the impact on early market survival 
of this launch tactics depends on the maturity of the technology underlying the new 
service. 
 
Using a dataset comprising more than 28,300 new mobile Value Added Services 
(VAS) launched in Italy between 2003 and 2006, the paper shows that increasing the 
number of external organizations involved in the adoption network is a particularly 
appropriate tactical decision for new services based on very novel technologies, 
whereas building an adoption network that involves organizations with high brand 
awareness in the eyes of prospective customers positively impacts the early market 
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survival of services relying on mature technologies. The centrality of decisions 
regarding the configuration of the adoption network has already been acknowledged 
in marketing research (McKenna, 1985 and Wind and Mahajan, 1987), but it has 
become even more critical in today’s highly networked markets. 
 
Therefore, product and marketing managers who are seeking to maximize the chances 
of early survival of the services they are responsible for, should be well aware of the 
implications on customer acceptance of their decisions concerning the configuration 
of the adoption network. They are encouraged in particular to consider the maturity of 
the technology on which the new service is based, and the resulting resistance to 
adoption on the part of the prospective customers, to understand what tactics are more 
appropriate to encourage after launch diffusion. 
Specifically, our study allows to argue that decisions related to innovative products or 
services launch, beyond encompassing traditional choices at an product development 
and marketing strategy level, should consider: 
(i) the size and configuration of the adoption network from which the innovation 
springs. In addition to nurturing a wide and defendable internal resources 
endowment (Hamel and Prahalad, 1997), managers should carefully craft their 
portfolio of external relationships, as they equally affect their business. When 
taking this decisions, managerial trade-offs emerge, which shall not be 
overlooked. Involving a large number of actors make coordination and 
transaction costs arise, but proves to be a “necessary evil” whenever the new 
product is radically new, being based on embryonic technologies, and needs to 
be backed by a larger pool of players merging bundling their resources in it; 
on the contrary, “incremental innovations” based on mature technologies 
(requiring lower investments, and probably implying lower stakes) are more 
efficiently managed by smaller, strongly-coupled nets; 
(ii) brand awareness of the organizations comprised in the adoption network. 
Though adoption network’s brand awareness appears not be so significant in 
the investigated industry, managers should choose wisely which companies to 
partner with: top firms with high reputation should be selected as partners 
when those firms are known for their ability to market innovations based on 
well-established technologies; in case of radical innovations based on new or 
embryonic technologies, what appears to matter the most is the creative 
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capability to ignite R&D processes. Such capability sometimes prospers in 
low-tier firms with scarce brand awareness, which may become the best mates 
for new product development and commercialization endeavors; 
(iii)maturity of the underlying technology. Decisions related to this variable 
proved to affect the kind of adoption network to merge within, as well as the 
expected early market survival of new products and services; 
(iv) early market survival as a key indicator for assessing R&D and marketing 
functions performance, since such proxy highlights the firm’s ability to 
develop truly marketable innovations. 
 
Concerning research implications, our study aims at contributing to several literature 
streams: 
(i) innovation launch strategies and tactics. With reference to innovation launch, 
the paper suggests to enlarge the scope of existing theory downstream: 
scholars investigating new product launch should focus on a further critical 
dimension when studying innovation success, i.e. early market survival. Early 
market survival is not necessarily correlated with market and profitability 
performance (Asterbo and Michela, 2005) and therefore it deserves specific 
attention. This especially because the survival of new ventures often depends 
on the early success of their innovation launches. Launch strategy and new 
product management research could investigate in the future what other 
endogenous (i.e. managerial levers) and exogenous (i.e. environmental 
conditions) variables affect this particular aspect of innovation performance. 
The paper also adds to our understanding of diffusion processes by 
investigating how a critical supply-side variable (i.e. a decision taken during 
the commercialization of the innovation, such as the choice on the maturity of 
the technology underlying the innovation) influences an important dimension 
of diffusion, i.e. early market survival; 
(ii)  role of the adoption network in innovation uptake and success. Considering 
the role of the adoption network in innovation uptake and success, the study 
proposes to investigate two key factors or network characteristics: the net’s 
size and the participating actors’ brand awareness. The findings on the 
importance of involving a large party of potentially renown actors, mediated 
by the underlying technology’s consolidation, suggest to add more dimensions 
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of analysis to recent research exploring how networks affect innovation’s 
development, commercialization and, ultimately, success and survival (see e.g. 
Aarikka-Stenroos and Sandberg, 2012). The paper contributes to the literature 
about innovation networks highlighting the moderating role played by the 
maturity of the underlying technology on the relationship between the size of 
the adoption network and the early market survival. More specifically it 
underlines the crucial role played by the size of the adoption network: services 
based on embryonic technologies and launched by large adoption network 
show higher innovation survival. This means that companies have to 
reconfigure their network according to the evolution of new underlying 
technologies. As argued by Halinen and Tornroos (1998), networks are 
commonly viewed as dynamic and constantly changing, but only a few 
attempts have been made to describe and explain these dynamics. Our findings 
underline as companies have to align their networks according to the evolution 
of underlying technologies. 
 
The study has of course several limitations that suggest interesting opportunities for 
further research. First, the paper focuses on early diffusion in consumer markets, 
especially where it is of vital importance to maximize the likelihood of early market 
success for each new product that is launched. Even if it seems possible to argue that 
the findings of the paper apply also to similar industries, such as the broadcasting, 
movie, or publishing industries, future research will have to study if the impact of 
decisions concerning adoption network configuration on early market survival hold 
also in other markets. Second, we purposefully focused on high-technology new 
services in this paper. It could be interesting to study what launch tactics affect the 
odds of after launch survival for other types of  innovations, e.g., design-driven 
innovations. Third, a partly simplistic view on the delineation of networks was 
adopted, so as to focus on key players and core activities: as suggested in Prenkert 
(2012), future works could devote an higher effort in modeling the multifaceted nature 
of development and adoption nets. Finally, further theoretical and empirical analyses 
are needed to discover how decisions concerning adoption network configuration 
affect other characteristics of the diffusion process, e.g., the speed at which new 
products and services are adopted. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
Marketing Manager – Vodafone Italy (MNO) 
Sales Manager – Reitek (MSP) 
Marketing Manager – Dylogic (MTP) 
CEO – Beeweeb (MSP) 
Marketing Manager – David2 (MSP) 
Vice President – Qualcomm Italy 
Marketing & Sales Manager – Ericsson Italy (MTP) 
CEO – Mblox (MSP) 
CEO – Polymedia (MSP) 
Product Manager – Buongiorno (MSP) 
 
List of people interviewed prior to starting the empirical study 
 
Interviews details. 
 Time span: interviews were carried out in the period December 2010 – March 
2011; 
 Number of interviews: thirteen (ten in the first round; 3 follow-up interviews); 
 All interviews were conducted according to the same list of open-ended 
questions (see the Table below) in order to obtain comparable results; 
 Interviews’ average length: one hour twelve minutes; 
 Contact modality: eight interviews conducted in person, five conducted by 
telephone (including the three follow-ups).  
 
 
What activities are needed to commercialize a new mobile VAS? 
What players can be involved by the MSP in the commercialization process? 
Are any of these activities exclusively under the responsibility of the Mobile 
Service Provider or any other player? 
What activities of the commercialization process are visible to the end user? 
What players can be involved in these front-end activities by the Mobile 
Service Provider? 
What type of brand awareness do the different players of the mobile VAS 
industry enjoy? 
Is the decision to purchase a new mobile VAS affected by the technology 
underlying it? 
What underlying technology increases resistance to change on the part of the 
potential user?  
Does the pre-purchase resistance due to the presence of a particular 
underlying technology change over time? 
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List of open-ended questions used in the preliminary interviews. 
What factors inhibit and streamline the diffusion of a new mobile VAS? 
Why is the average life-cycle of a new mobile VAS so short?  
Why some new mobile VAS are retired very early from the market by the 
Mobile Service Provider? 
What factors increase and shorten the survival rate of a new mobile VAS? 
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[i] Mobile VAS are defined in this article as application-to-person (A2P) services beyond standard 
voice calls and fax transmissions. A value added service (VAS) is popular as a telecommunications 
industry term for non-core services. 
 
[ii] More precisely, data were collected through an annual detailed census on all VAS published “on 
portal”, i.e., present on the MNO-branded and owned delivery channel, and accessible by end users 
through a Wireless Application Protocol (WAP) connection. The focus on the on portal environment is 
fully justified by considering that: (i) only a non-significant fraction of VAS innovation appears on the 
off portal, non MNO-controlled world (Peppard and Rylander, 2006); (ii) and such an off portal offer is 
hardly reachable by customers – especially in the timeframe relevant for the present study –, because of 
industry-specific constraints (Ghezzi and Balocco, 2011). 
 
[iii] Such 2003-2007 timeframe is selected taking into account that the ICT & Management 
Observatories Research Group significantly changed the data collection criteria for those services 
launched from 2008 onward: therefore, we decided to restrict the scope of our analysis to the five-years 
period mentioned.  
 
